Hungary has transformed tremendously from a socialist, Communist-dominated society into a democratic multiparty system. Since the fall of the ideological and physical separation of Europe known as the “Iron Curtain” in 1989, Hungary has coped with many new, foreign, and often disputed political changes. First I will address the Communist legacy and how the demise of the regime provoked the new era of democratic change. This area will focus more so on the fall of Communism and how the transition began. I will then concentrate on the “negotiated transition” that took place and how it provoked economic changes to a capitalist economy, and the political institutions that formed as a result of the transition. I will then describe Hungary’s membership with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Then I will attend to the political parties that have formed and the policies they aim to implement. Lastly, I will include a section on how the government is perceived by the Hungarian natives before including my own personal experience and observations. Overall it will encompass the Hungarian Democratic Transition since 1989 and how it is perceived today.
Prior to the political transition of 1989, Hungary was a country that had succumbed to the Communist regime and forced lifestyle. “Students in Hungary were tied down in a political, cultural, and economic straight jacket,” (László, 10). After the devastation of WWII and Nazi occupation, the country had looked toward a new regime that promised the citizens a new lifestyle and society that was devoid of societal tensions. The regime presented an ideal system of “social, political, and economic institutions guaranteeing all citizens equal rights and equal access to the benefits of the welfare state,” (Wolchik and Curry, 198). Essentially, a system that would generate and maintain a prosperous society that was free of conflict. Some natives even admitted that initially, the Communists succeeded in bringing that prosperity to Hungary. “The communists provided everyone with guaranteed employment, good education, and free healthcare. Violent crime was virtually non-existent,” (Clark, 1).
Between 1948 and 1989, a Communist one-party rule existed in Hungary that could be described as mostly totalitarian (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 106). Every aspect and sphere of life—economic, political, social, and cultural—was determined by this one centralized government system without opposition. “[It] stressed the unprecedented importance of an explicit, totalizing ideology, which sought to give prescriptions for all aspects of life,” (Kovrig, 3). Unfortunately, that dictatorial political system enforced a constricted and oppressive way of life that was loyal to one illiberal ideology. It was the Revolution of 1956 that set the wave of protest and resistance in motion. From October 23 to November 10 in Hungary’s capital of Budapest, what began as a student protest turned into a fatal revolt against the government and its Soviet-imposed policies (Hollis, 46). After an attempt of a student delegation to take over the radio building to broadcast its demands, the State Security Police (ÁVH) began to open fire on the student demonstration outside the building. Once word spread, thousands organized into militias in order to fight the ÁVH (Hollis, 47-48). In sight of the bloody revolt, the new government agreed to disband the ÁVH and pledged to reestablish free elections to the country. A sense of normality returned to the citizens by the end of October as the fighting had almost ceased completely (Hollis, 49-50).
After what seemed like a victory to the pro-revolutionary Hungarians, the Politburo (Communist executive committee) retracted its promise to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest, and instead moved to end the revolution (Hollis, 50). On November 4, Soviet forces invaded Budapest and battled Hungarian resistance until the tenth. “Over 2,500 Hungarians and 700 Soviet troops were killed in the conflict, and 200,000 Hungarians fled as refugees,” (Hollis, 50). By January of the new year, the Soviet government had ceased all public suppression after a massive wave of arrests and public condemnations. Despite the failed attempt by the Hungarian natives, it was the first full-fledged uprising that voiced the discontent of the public toward the totalitarian government.
In spite of the fatalities and violence under the Communists, Hungary was largely regarded as “the happiest barrack of the camp,” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 118). This represented the idea that although the country was consumed in the rules and regulations of Soviet rule, it was still the most Western-oriented country in Eastern Europe. This included privileges such as the permission to visit the West with relatively few restrictions, a lack of widespread police brutality, and overall a higher level of cultural freedom comparatively to the rest of the area (Barany and Völgyes, 178). Hungary was also referred to as having the type of communism dubbed as “goulash communism.” This represented the government pushing for slight reform, creating an economic growth while still maintaining certain traditions of Hungarian culture (Barany and Völgyes, 178). This was intended to suggest the relatively ready availability of consumer goods in comparison to its neighboring countries. Simultaneously, the reference was metaphoric as it referred to goulash, a popular Hungarian dish that is made of a variety of different ingredients. Similarly, this “goulash communism” claimed to be of mixed ideology instead of just purely communistic (Barany and Völgyes, 178). Essentially, the communists gave Hungarians the promises of a more pleasant life, higher living standards, and more personal liberties than were enjoyed or allowed by their neighbors (Barany and Völgyes, 178).
The fall of communism and onset of the democratic transition can be attributed to a number of different factors. Many accredit it to Hungarian natives starting to challenge legitimization of the communist government. Hence, this brings forth an era of social instability (Kovács, 125). According to Steven Saxonberg, the communist party completely lost its ideological legitimacy in the 1980s and began to fear another revolution similar to the one in 1956 (184). When Mikhael S. Gorbachev took office in 1985, he made extreme efforts to launch his own and newer version of Communism through ideas of glastnost and perestroika (Jost, 1). With these new proposals of openness and restructuring, reform movements around Eastern Europe were instantly bolstered. By the time 1989 came around, Gorbachev realized that “the Soviet Union was now in too weak a position domestically to maintain its iron grip on Eastern Europe and understood that it would be better to concentrate on internal reforms,” (Gros and Steinherr, 32). For the first time, authoritarian aspirations no longer seemed as important.
The Soviet Union also had another war on its hand with Afghanistan at the time, giving them more than enough on their plate to handle. Some others believe that it was ultimately the failure of the Soviet Union to catch up economically with the West that led to its decline in power (Gros and Steinherr, 42). The fall of the iron curtain, allowing citizens to flow freely in Germany and also across the Hungarian-Austrian border, also was a factor in the gradual decline of communism (Klingemann, 148). For all these reasons, communist rule declined in Hungary, and at first, the natives were overjoyed. “The end of communism was first perceived as a perplexing, great surprise, a miracle that defied human comprehension,” (Kovrig, 2-3). Despite the one rather violent revolution in 1956, Hungary was viewed largely as a peaceful and smooth transition from Communism to democracy due to its “negotiated revolution,” (Klingemann, 149).
Once the fall of communism had become inevitable and foreseeable, negotiations started between the party-state and the Opposition Roundtable (ORT). This Opposition Roundtable party became a unified force in order to demand negotiations with the government over the nature and timing of the country’s democratic transition (Wolchik and Curry, 27). These negotiations are largely why Hungary is seen as a non-violent and smooth transitioning country because it was essentially achieved through discussions rather than bloody overthrow. The ORT was unified under the main principles of destroying and disposing of all communist remains including its ideology, political ideals and institutions (Tökés, 375). Negotiations were sustained by one sizeable agreement: that Hungary had slowly delved into deep economic trouble that may be tough to recover from. What the two parties did disagree on, however, was the degree of privatization that the country should partake in. The discussions of how to create a market economy, a corresponding characteristic of a democracy, were underway.
Under communist ideology and rule, it was believed that private property and small production were barriers to large-scale production and economic concentration. This ultimately led to the belief that private ownership was thus a hindrance to economic progress (Kovrig, 6). The labor market was eliminated and universal state employment was enforced. This “became the pivotal institution of social order under state socialism,” (Kovrig, 6). Privatization was therefore the reversal of the collectivization that the communist regime had implemented. Privatization entails the transfer of state owned property or enterprise to private ownership. Therefore, this step was required to finalize the transition to capitalism and a market economy. “History has shown that a market economy based on private property performs much better than socialism,” (Gros and Steinherr, 76). By putting all profit-producing assets under government rule, incentive for improvement was essentially lost. Now, part of the transition into a market economy would include reinstituting that market incentive in order to promote efficiency. Secondly, privatization would distribute those assets in a more fair way because it would be based purely on ownership rather than a haphazard decision based on the government. Lastly, the ORT pushed for privatization based on their belief that the decentralized type of market economy is the perfect compatible companion for a decentralized democracy (Gros and Steinherr, 76). These policies were also invented in order to encourage direct foreign investment.
This step toward a market economy was crucial to the transition to democracy. While Hungarians knew that many alterations would have to be made politically, simultaneous economic changes toward a capitalistic economy also had to occur. According to János Mátyás Kovács, “Capitalism is an economic system in which the means of production are privately owned and operated for profit, usually in competitive markets,” (34). This process would essentially include marketization, privatization, stabilization, modernization and opening up to the West. This integration into the Western-style capitalism was one of the biggest struggles for Hungary after plunging into an economic crisis left by the communist regime (Wolchik and Curry, 32). Much of this emphasis put on the importance of the nation’s economy is much of the reason why joining the European Union (EU) was so encouraged, yet at the same time, controversial.
“The economic situation is by far the most important predictor for satisfaction with democracy, twice as important as the perceived guarantee of freedom,” (Pollack, 126). With the new perseverance to integrate into the Western market and transform the communist command economy into a capitalist, free market economy, conversations about joining the European Union were initiated. The EU is an “economic and political partnership that represents a unique form of cooperation among its 27 member states,” (Archick and Mix, 2). Initially, the organization was created after WWII to promote peace and economic prosperity in Europe with the hopes that this would prevent another war in Europe. If it were to happen, there would be a more united front for protection purposes. This organization generated a single market in which goods, people, and capital could move freely and member states work together through common institutions to set policies while also promoting their collective interests (Archick and Mix, 2). Before Hungary applied to be an official EU member-country in 1993 (Gros and Steinherr, 265), the EU’s free trade area is what made the most sense to Hungarian officials in order to boost the economy of Hungary and hopefully bring in foreign capital and investment. The EU already accounted for over 60 per cent of the overall foreign trade of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Gros and Steinherr, 265). With the western economy thriving, it became more and more tempting to be a part of this system and logically thrive from the same profit and success.
However, joining the EU was not an agreed-upon decision among Hungarian natives. Some were afraid that in an attempt to achieve the goal of becoming a part of the EU, they would be willing to sacrifice the interests and goals of the individual Hungarians (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 118).The major economic argument against becoming a member was that free trade with the entire world is naturally favored over trade with merely one specific geographic region (Gros and Steinherr, 265). Those who opposed membership believed that Hungary could simply push for trade in regions all over the world instead of investing all time and resources into one area smaller than all combined regions available to trade with. In reality, those in favor of joining the EU countered that the EU member-countries account for 80-90 per cent of all trade with the wealthier part of the world (Gros and Steinherr, 265). Thus, this could potentially mean free trade with the only market in the world that truly matters to Hungary. Beyond the political support and military protection that the EU could provide, it could offer the financial support that Hungary desperately needed during its economic recession. Now that the country was no longer under the power of an authoritarian government, this was motivation to take advantage of the elimination of border controls and stability of free trade. Stability would be supported by legal provisions and institutional assistance. It was essentially a “strong incentive to establish rapidly an institutional framework that promotes growth,” (Gros and Steinherr, 269). The EU was a big step in helping decentralize the oppressive system that kept Hungary underwater for decades.
EU membership application must then progress to requirements the country must abide by in order to be accepted into the EU. It requires that the candidate country has “achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,” (Wolchik and Curry, 112-113). It is easy for states who are already members of the EU to be reluctant to accept a country that may state its intent and willingness to join, but does not actually meet the basic requirements of political stability, security, or economic growth (Wolchik and Curry, 112-113). It is easy to see why Hungary—with a recent communist history— may have been in a position where not all member-states were comfortable with offering acceptance into the EU. Nevertheless, Hungary became a frontrunner country in building democracy and capitalism from scratch in a post-communist Europe by passing EU’s ‘democracy test’ in 1999 and then later becoming fully-fledged members in 2004. Hungary continued to prove its willingness to meet EU requirements of political and economic stability even after acquiring membership. Based on a record of compliance with EU laws, the new member states’ record of compliance and cooperation was on average better than the old member states’ record two years after being accepted into the EU. This suggests that “the accession process had deep and lasting effects in building state institutions that were both willing to meet, and capable of meeting, EU requirements,” (Wolchik and Curry, 125).
Hungary’s transition into the EU was also aided by the Europe Agreements (EA) between the EU on one side and the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the other side. The EAs principle aim was to further the integration of the Central-Eastern European Countries by providing additional steps toward opening up more Western political and economic benefits (Gros and Steinherr, 264). This included measures toward the free movement of goods and services, establishing a framework for political dialogue, balancing legislation, cooperating on science and technology, and providing for financial assistance and technical cooperation from the EU (Gros and Steinherr, 264). The EA essentially served as an extra security blanket to help smooth over any cross-Atlantic tensions and assure structure and solidarity within the EU.
Hungary also succeeded in joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1999. Although NATO was originally created in 1949 as a military alliance, its recent expansion was motivated more so by political gains (Cooper,1). In 1998, after the 16 member-states of NATO had gone through hearings and conversations of expanding NATO, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were offered membership (Garcia, 1). Although Hungary originally inquired about NATO membership to counter the Soviet Union, it became a vital link between North America and Europe. According to a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “NATO is no longer so much about collective defense as it is about collective security,” (Cooper, 1). Unlike the EU, NATO does not require its members to undergo any institutional reform, but does provide that communal security of allies in case of any future conflicts. Article 5 states that, “an armed attack on one or more members of NATO will be deemed an attack against them all,” (Cooper,2). It only made sense for Hungary to turn to NATO principally for security reasons as a post-Soviet bloc country. Some critics of expanding NATO eastward, however, say that the newer members—many of which are weak militarily—are transforming the military alliance into a political club that in reality has little power (Cooper, 1). What needs to be stressed more often however, a member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says, is the fact that since the Cold War, military cohesion is not the only feature of NATO. “It’s not just about interoperability, the joint command that allows the militaries to train together, or the fact that the United States can count on its NATO allies for overflight and basing rights. There is also a unity of political purpose and common values,” (Cooper, 2).
Despite the alliances of EU and NATO, both Central European countries as well as the United States were worried about the polarizing effects between those who have military supremacy, and those who do not. Since WWII, periodic conflict has occurred between America and its overwhelming military power and Europe’s main focus on economic development (Cooper, 1). With such different pasts, the two continents were simply in different positions globally that molded their national interests differently. For Hungary, it was simply another open door to Western economic and political benefits. More recently, Hungary has suffered economically, and consequently became the first EU member to ask the International Monetary Fund for a $27 billion bailout in 2009 (Country Watch, 1). Hungary also led the EU in unemployment in 2009 according to federal statisticians in Budapest in a report (Country Watch, 1).
Political and institutional reformation was another step of the democratic transition. A dictatorial political system had to be replaced by a more liberal or democratic one. “Democratic transition is a controlled transformation from a more illiberal state to a more liberal one,” (Kovács, 125). According to Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe, a complete transformation has to pass through two separate stages in order to be considered as successful: “an initial stage of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and a stage of consolidation of the new system,” (Pollack, 117). Democratic consolidation can be viewed as the process by which a democracy progresses. This includes the stability of the new government, the effectiveness of its basic functions and principles, and the process of adaptation regarding the behavior and attitudes that promote such stabilization (Pollack, 117). By adhering to these principles of consolidation, the country becomes less likely to revert back to authoritarianism. Consolidation chiefly describes the strength of a country that undergoes a democratic transition. “Hungary can be characterized as a consolidated democracy as far as public support for democracy as an ideal form of government is concerned,” (Klingemann, 168).
Transforming the government from an authoritarian, Communist one to a Parliamentary representative government was one of the many hurdles Hungary had to jump in order to become a democracy. Thus, Hungary created a political system that was based on a multiparty system with representative bodies based upon free elections (Wolchik and Curry, 33). Hence, Hungary became a Parliamentary republic instead of a presidential one. In this system, the Hungarian government transitioned from an extreme, centralized structure to a more decentralized structure that enhanced roles for local and regional government structures (Wolchik and Curry, 38). The government is headed by two key figures: the President and the Prime Minister. The President is selected indirectly by Parliament and behaves more so as a ceremonial figure with few powers rather than a key-political figure (Wolchik and Curry, 131). He possesses primarily symbolic functions more than anything else (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 107).
On the other hand, the Prime Minister holds the majority of the power, especially in executive leadership and policy-making roles. He is usually the leader of Parliament’s largest party at the time of leadership (Wolchik and Curry, 131). The Prime Minister also inherits full responsibility over the Cabinet and its activities which give him a great deal of executive power. However, while the President usually serves for about five years at a time, the prime ministers have exercised fairly short stints of power. “The backlash against authoritarian regimes triggered by the harrowing experience of communism served as a catalyst for putting greater store in representative institutions than in strong rulers,” (Wolchik and Curry, 135). Sure enough, the quick series of different prime ministers has indicated citizens’ caution of a strong and powerful executive. As a result, no prime ministers have been reelected for consecutive terms (Wolchik and Curry, 204).
In order to continue to decentralize the once all-unified government, the opposition parties during the roundtable negotiations demanded that as many seats as possible in the unicameral Parliament be based on proportionality rather than majority vote (Saxonberg, 293). By the end of negotiations, a compromise was reached that required around half the seats based on proportionality and the other half on majoritarian elections. Through these alterations, Hungary was able to establish a representative Parliament “built upon the traditional principle of parliamentary representation, and, through universal suffrage, it guarantees democratic political representation,” (Körösényi, 228). Parliament—through a four year term—is there in order to make laws, train political elites, integrate the diversity of its citizens and institutions, oversee national administration and helps to articulate social interests (Wolchik and Curry, 145).
Like I said earlier, universal suffrage and fair elections would have to play a large role in guaranteeing this political representation. In March and April of 1990, Hungary held its first free and fair election (Wolchik and Curry, 33). Although “elections” had been held during the communist era, the regime had used them as an unfair, political tool to manipulate votes and give the appearance of a majority win (Wolchik and Curry, 163). Based on that not-so-subtle manipulation history, it is not surprising that the reform of electoral institutions played a prominent role in the transition process during negotiations. “The aim of reformers was to ensure, first, that elections would be conducted on a multiparty basis, and, second, that they were to be free of manipulation by the communist authorities,” (Wolchik and Curry, 165). Much time was spent debating the topic of elections during the roundtable talks. The 1990 election became a founding election that gave a popular mandate to political parties that had made promises to the public to lay the foundations to a new political system based on fairness, proportionality and representation (Tökés, 383). In this liberal democracy, citizens elect certain representatives to Parliament, and then these representatives who have become accountable to the citizens through the electoral process, in turn hold the government to account (Wolchik and Curry, 148). However, the representation functions through political parties. Those parties select and campaign for lists of representatives.
Changes to the Hungarian Constitution must also be made in order to ensure permanence and legality to the new political changes. These new changes in the constitution made sure to list civil liberties as well as introduce certain mechanisms to safeguard individual rights (Wolchik and Curry, 38). Much of the constitutional reform looked toward the political experience and constitutional authority of Western Europe for a baseline (Wolchik and Curry, 138). Similarly to the scandal of elections during the communist regime, constitutions were also used as a façade behind which the communists controlled the elements of power (Wolchik and Curry, 230). In Hungary, as well as other Eastern and Central European countries such as Poland, new constitutional amendments were created with the goal of creating a limited government (Wolchik and Curry, 230). Through this, constitutions regained their central role in defining political life, instead of acting as a shield of political manipulation and exploitation. “The new constitution kept the structure of the old one, but it was substantially revised, sentence by sentence,” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 106).
The last aspect regarding political transition is the creation of a multiparty system with a new set of political parties. Prior to 1989, political parties were not entirely free to form their own identity and in political games and slogans. However, after 1989, they were given the freedom to form their own ‘partisan’ (Tökés, 369). Initially, the political cleavage was between the reform socialists (or Communists) and the non-socialists and Communists (Tökés, 371). In the beginning of 1989, there were mixed feelings about a new multiparty system. Many believed that it was an involuntary action by the falling communist regime to break into many similar-like parties that would eventually combine into one all-party national coalition government (Tökés, 372). This was brought about by the reformers in January 1989 through a Central Committee resolution that allowed new parties to register as legal organizations (Saxonberg, 285).
Three political camps with separate political parties developed from there; the Socialist political camp consisted of the MSzP-left wing/modernizing, social democrats—also known as the Hungarian Socialist Party (Körösényi, 32). The former communist group became the only socialist player in town. They dominated the center-left area of the political spectrum (Wolchik and Curry, 44-45). The other political camp that developed was the liberal camp that consists of SzDSz, the Liberal Alliance of Free Democrats and Fidesz (a free-market-oriented political party) or the Young Democrats (Jost, 1). Fidesz formed as an alternative to the official Communist youth group (Saxonberg, 287). SzDSz emerged from what were originally protest groups. These groups were based on the principles of human rights, liberal economics and radical intellectuals (Körösényi, 32). SzDSz sought to implement a truly Western-style model and reject the pre-communist and communist past. However, SzDSz became Fidesz’s biggest political enemy (Wolchik and Curry, 43).
Fidesz began to occupy the center-right area of the political spectrum. They started as merely a radical, anti-communist youth organization, but ended up winning nine per cent of the vote in 1990 (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 111). The group changed its political identity from a radical-liberal-alternative party to a center-right moderate pragmatist party (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 111). The last of the three political camps is the conservative camp which consists of MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum), KDNP, and FKGP-national. This area of the political spectrum was mostly for the Christian middle-class (Körösényi, 32). While the conservative MDF won the initial parliamentary election in 1990, they lost to the post-communist Hungarian Socialist Party four years later (Jost, 1). Then, the political parties began attempting to attract different voters, and battle for majority vote. SzDSz tried to increase its popularity with the public by depicting themselves as the most anti-Communist of all the parties (Körösényi, 32). Meanwhile, they accused the MDF as being too eager to please the Communists. Fidesz was simultaneously also criticizing the socialists while promising the public more generous social benefits (Körösényi, 32). Fidesz warned the public of being led by “socialist millionaires” who ruined the country’s economy and destroyed the profile of the “simple Hungarian,” (Vago, 1). It was clear that the political ideology playing field was very much divided between the left and the right. As that distinction became well-marked, the number of parliamentary parties fell and a highly polarized two-bloc system emerged from the multiparty system (Wolchik and Curry, 44-45). By 2002, the party system completely revolved around the two major actors of the Hungarian Socialist Party and Fidesz (Wolchik and Curry, 44-45). The small SzDSz party sided with the Socialists while the small MDF party sided with Fidesz in 2006 (Wolchik and Curry, 43). “A sharp polarization separates the post-communist parties from the anti-communist opposition,” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 11). In a survey, the majority of Hungarians were overall supportive of having several parties as opposed to one ruling party, but were discouraged by the conflict potential and polarization between groups in a multiparty system (Tökés, 372).
Hungarians were wary of extremist political parties. After the Communist era, it seemed as though anything that appeared as extreme or overpowering was judged with caution and hesitance. “Hungarian political culture is characterized by its moderation; voters always prefer moderate, centrist politics, opposing all kinds of extremism,” (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 109). In any case, Hungarians were more likely to vote for the political party itself rather than the individual. After regaining their freedom, Hungarians were not looking for any extreme transformation from the political parties—they were simply looking for a better life. However, political participation in Hungary has remained low across the charts. Membership in political parties is low, voter turnout in elections has been on the decline, and cynicism and apathy toward the government is frequently reported (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 162).
Many views were based on incomplete or distorted views of what political parties actually were and what purpose they actually served (Tökés, 374). Political parties were created with the intention of providing personnel and leaders to the new political institutions. The selection of leaders ranges from the choice of candidates for Parliament to the election of government members and the president of the public. All are selected by political parties (Körösényi, 29). As the main components of policy-making, political parties’ relations directly affect the government stability. Much of it depends on their cohesion and party discipline (Wolchik and Curry, 42). Overall, two large parties—one from the right and one from the left—came to dominate the political scene.
Today, the liberal party Fidesz holds majority in Parliament, and their leader Viktor Orban is the prime minister (Country Watch, 1). In 2010, Fidesz had won nearly 68 per cent of the poll, and the socialists came in second with 15 per cent. After leading the country for the past eight years, the leaders of the socialist party resigned (Country Watch, 1). According to the Country Watch article, the public had grown tired of the Socialists’ inability to improve the Hungarian budget and stop the rise of unemployment which still towered at 11 per cent (1). Although starting out as the “young democrat’s” party, with most members under 35 years of age, the party was able to change the public’s perception from a traditional political society, to trusting those who were from a younger generation (Tökés, 387). “It appears as though Fidesz’s ‘new politics’—that of sincerity, plain speaking, and personal integrity—was mainly responsible for this psychological breakthrough,” (Tökés, 387). With a two-thirds majority, Orban will have the ability to lead a powerful single-party government with the potential to change aspects of the constitution (Country Watch, 1). Although mainly an occupant of the center-right area of the political spectrum, the party also bids for votes in the extreme right wing (Wolchik and Curry, 176).
While Fidesz stresses the importance of a new beginning (similar to the Liberal Alliance of Free Democrats), the socialist (or Communist) party is more interested in continuing some aspects of the pre-communist system and would rather hold on to aspects of the past (Kovács, 122). According to a New York Times Article, in 1989 the party announced drastic changes to become the most democratic of all parties in order to eliminate the negative connotations (Kamm, 1). Prime Minister Nemeth, the prime minister at the time, said that it needed new organization, a new platform, and a new membership. “’Our members should not be a flock of sheep following a bellwether,’” (Kamm, 1). In recent elections in July 2009, the Hungarian Socialist Party was defeated and the society moved even further to the right wing (Salzmann, 1). In the March-April elections of 1990, the party became almost irrelevant when they were unable to muster up the 4 percent of votes necessary for parliamentary representation (Barany and Völgyes, 179).
During the Communist era, the public was incredibly critical to the communist-led regime, but at the same time favored more “socialist” reforms (Saxonberg, 392). Overall they favored ridding the government of total communist control. The party has been an up-and-down experience with success and failure. After their initial failure in 1990, they returned to power in 1994, “coinciding with the general revival of former communist parties elsewhere in Eastern Europe,” (Tong, 203). However, they then descended into economic downfall and fell into deep recession (Tong, 203). Eventually, they did regain some power in 2002 when they were able to gain ten more seats in Parliament (Wolchik and Curry, 44-45).
Overall and by European and North American countries alike, Hungary was viewed as a successful, largely peaceful, and gradual transition into a post-communist culture and democratic society. It was a non-violent one based on the consensus of the elite (Klingemann, 148). Support from political parties and the population at large “made the reforms credible in the sense that the perceived risk of reversal or macroeconomic destabilization was close to zero,” (Gros and Steinherr, 60). In comparison from other communist countries, Hungary—along with Poland—was less radical in achieving extensive constitutional reform (Wolchik and Curry, 233). The most difficult task in the forefront of transition was finding a peaceful and successful solution to the “simultaneity problem,”—simultaneous political and economic transition (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 119). The democracy was built on the patience of those who were struggling the most from the economic downfall. Hungary was dedicated to achieving both formal and substantive democracy. Formal refers to the institutions and common procedures of democracy, while substantive relies on the ability of the individual citizen to influence decisions that affect his or her life so that the institutions can be directly responsive to their demands (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 162).
In being responsive to the demands and opinions of the public, natives’ position toward the government is important. Much of the success in the RoundTable talks, as mentioned earlier, had to do with the Hungarians new strategy of achieving democratic change after learning from the devastation of 1956 (Kovács, 127). There needed to be a shift from open confrontation, to the presentation of human rights that were vital to the Hungarian citizens (Kovács, 127). After establishing a multiparty democracy, connections between the Central European country and the West were more easily fostered. “Hungary was willing to be a reliable, cooperative partner in this process,” (Király and Bozóki, 455).
However, since the establishment of democracy, political participation and trust has declined rapidly. “Satisfaction with the parliament and with the character and efficiency of representation is rather low, reflecting the antipathy towards parties and politics that is a part of Hungarian political culture,” (Körösényi, 228). After the communist-based regime and the legacy it left behind after the Revolution of 1956, many Hungarians have remained politically passive and distrustful to politicians in light of that legacy (Barany and Völgyes, 182). According to public opinion polls, most citizens believe that the political and economic systems have gotten worse compared to the socialist past (Pollack, 119). While most are typically satisfied with the new realization of civil liberties and justice, only a minority are satisfied in regard to the distribution of wealth and the chance to get a job (Pollack, 121).
Sure enough, it has been said that economic hard times are usually the culprit of the most serious obstacles to achieving democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe (Klingemann, 354). Hungarian native Andrew Jones, an Eastern European expert at the University of California at Berkeley, said that it is largely due to the gap between the idealist expectations of the natives, and reality. “Each time a Hungarian travels to Vienna, they return disappointed because the standard of living is twice what it is in Hungary. The gap cannot be bridged easily,” (Jost, 1). However, criticism in the government should not be taken as a rejection to democratic institutions altogether. While there was a high degree of skepticism with regard to democracy in the early years of transition, in time, there came an almost unanimous acceptance of democracy as a form of government (Klingemann, 150). In the Central European countries, citizen support for democracy increased from 74 percent in 1994 to 79 percent in 1998 (Klingemann, 163). “The same publics that are becoming increasingly critical of hierarchal authority, are also becoming increasingly resistant to authoritarian government, more interested in political life, and more apt to play an active role in politics,” (Norris, 236).
In essence, criticism of the government is subconsciously advancing political knowledge and importance. However, it is not reflected in voting or political participation from the public. Decline in voting participation and party membership was universal (Wolchik and Curry, 206). Like stated earlier, the communist legacy leaving Hungarians with the feeling of powerlessness of the inability to affect political or economic events of their country is the root of citizens’ reluctance to participate (Kaldor and Vejvoda, 12).
Based on my firsthand experience in conversing with those living in Budapest, the majority of discontent with the government has come from the economic recession and widespread unemployment. When I talked to Dr. Ungar’s niece Yvette, I discussed with her the tendency of Hungarians when walking around the city to look straight down at the ground when they walk, seldom smile, and rarely engage in the type of “small talk” that Americans frequently do. She projected this behavior from the dissatisfaction with the government and overall state of living. “They’re mad at the government, they’re mad they don’t have enough money, and they’re mad that there are not enough jobs,” she said. When exchanging money from U.S. dollars to Hungarian Forints, it was evident that their currency was not particularly strong. Some think believe that this downfall was unavoidable. “It does not stem from the misconduct of the country, from the mismanagement of its international relations, but from its size, strategic importance and economic load-bearing capacity,” (Király and Bozóki, 470). And yet, when Dr. Ungar revealed his scarring memories from the Communist regime, it was clear to me also that despite the economic downturn, a democratic change in government was positive and beneficial overall. After all, it was a student in Budapest in 1956 who wrote in his diary, “We wanted Liberty with a capital L. We wanted the type of freedom Western democracies enjoyed,” (Beke, 23). In the grand scheme of it all—they got it.
